WHAT DOES HOLISM HAVE TO DO WITH MORAL PARTICULARISM?

Authors: McKeever, Sean1; Ridge, Michael2

Source: Ratio, Volume 18, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 93-103(11)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Abstract

Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call ‘holism in the theory of reasons.’ We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither provides any support for moral particularism.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00273.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy and Religion Ithaca College 109 Dillingham Center Ithaca, NY 14850-7286 USA, Email: smckeever@ithaca.edu 2: Michael Ridge University of Edinburgh David Hume Tower, George Square Edinburgh Scotland, United Kingdom EH8 9JX, Email: mridge@staffmail.ed.ac.uk

Publication date: March 1, 2005

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