THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND HIGHER-ORDER PROPERTIES

Authors: Horowitz, Amir1; Jacobson-Horowitz, Hilla2

Source: Ratio, Volume 18, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 48-64(17)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Abstract

The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00270.x

Affiliations: 1: The Open University of Israel 16 Klauzner Street, P.O. Box 39328, Tel-Aviv 61392, Israel., Email: amirho@openu.ac.il 2: Department of Philosophy Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.Box 653. Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel., Email: hillaj@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Publication date: March 1, 2005

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