TEMPORALLY LOCALISED FACTS AND THE PROBLEM OF INTRINSIC CHANGE
Hugh Mellor has proposed what appears to be a new solution to the problem of intrinsic change ( Mellor 1998). Assuming endurantism and a B-theoretic, nonpresentist view of time, facts are supposed to have only enduring things and atemporal properties (or relations) as constituents, but no times. The having of properties and relations is not relativised to times. Instead, the whole of a fact is conceived of as temporally localised. It will be argued that this interesting and novel proposal does not succeed as an account of change in the intrinsic properties of things. The basic difficulty is that the view still leads into contradiction, since it makes it incomprehensible how one and the same thing can have both a property and some incompatible property. The having of these incompatible properties is treated as two facts. But to add that these facts have certain temporal locations is of no help for avoiding the contradiction.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy and History University of Tübingen Bursagasse 1 72070 Tübingen Germany, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: March 1, 2005