@article {Neil:September 2004:0034-0006:294,
	author = "Neil Levy",
	title = "Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility",
	journal = "Ratio",
	volume = "17",
	year = "September 2004",
	abstract = "<P></P>The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they posses contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self-deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors.",
	pages = "294-311(18)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2004/00000017/00000003/art00004"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/j.0034-0006.2004.00255.x"
}