Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility

Author: Neil Levy

Source: Ratio, Volume 17, Number 3, September 2004 , pp. 294-311(18)

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $48.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they posses contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self-deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-0006.2004.00255.x

Affiliations: 1: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Australia

Publication date: 2004-09-01