Epistemicism and the Combined Spectrum
Authors: Torin Alter; Stuart Rachels
Source: Ratio, Volume 17, Number 3, September 2004 , pp. 241-255(15)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
Derek Parfit's combined-spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that the magnitude of a modification must be proportional to its effect.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-0006.2004.00252.x
Affiliations: 1: The University of Alabama, Department of Philosophy, Tuscaloosa, USA
Publication date: 2004-09-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Torin Alter ; Stuart Rachels

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