IngentaConnect Physicalism, Nothing Buttery, and Supervenience

Author: Hendel G.¹

Source: Ratio, Volume 14, Number 3, September 2001 , pp. 252-262(11)

Abstract:

I consider the position (which I call‘the triad’) according to which physicalism is a reductive claim which is capturable in terms of the idea (the ‘nothing buttery’ idea) that there is nothing but/nothing over and above the physical, an idea which, in its turn, is meant to be capturable in terms of a determinate form of supervenience. (Physicalism is then meant to be capturable in terms of the form of supervenience in question.) I argue that there is a tension in the triad. The notion of ‘nothing buttery’ required has features which can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad. Hence, one cannot have both physicalism as nothing-buttery-reductive and physicalism as supervenience of the kind in question. If one wants to hold onto the idea of physicalism as nothing-buttery-reductive, one must be prepared to identify physicalism with a much stronger claim than one might have originally thought, a claim that can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK; G.Hendel@ucl.ac.uk

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