Skip to main content

Tennant on Knowable Truth

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertibility of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00113

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, UK

Publication date: June 1, 2000

bpl/rati/2000/00000013/00000002/art00001
dcterms_title,dcterms_description,pub_keyword
6
5
20
40
5

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more