Tennant on Knowable Truth

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The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertibility of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00113

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, UK

Publication date: June 1, 2000

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