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On Defending Deontology

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This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent-relative/agent-neutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge a value-based defence of deontology proposed by Quinn (1993), Kamm (1989, 1992), and Nagel (1995).
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: Philosophy Department, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, England, 2: Philosophy Department, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis MO 63121-4499, USA

Publication date: 1998-04-01

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