The Regular Practice of Morality in Law

Author: GIUDICE, MICHAEL

Source: Ratio Juris, Volume 21, Number 1, March 2008 , pp. 94-106(13)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

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This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00381.x

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