Skip to main content

Norms that Confer Competence

Buy Article:

$43.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

The author maintains that norms that confer competence (or power) on persons should be understood as duty–imposing norms addressed to legal officials, rather than as special competence norms whose sole function is to confer competence, and which are addressed to the competence–holders themselves. The argument is that only duty–imposing norms are genuine norms in the sense that they give complete reasons for action. En route to this conclusion the author analyzes norms in terms of reasons for action, and considers the problem of norm–individuation and the action–guiding capacity of norms.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of Uppsala, Sweden

Publication date: 2003-03-01

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more