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Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy. Comparative Perspectives: USA, France, Italy

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The article sketches out questions that constitutional adjudication represents for democratic theory. After taking into account some of the reasons for the early emergence of judicial review in the United States, it considers different modalities of constitutional control in European countries (notably, France and Italy). Attention is drawn to the different mechanisms of referral, leading, for instance, to the political monopoly in France and to the (quasi) monopoly of the judiciary in Italy. Denying any sovereign power to the organs exercising constitutional control, the article puts forward the thesis that constitutional adjudication guarantees ultimately the control of political super-majorities over legislative majorities.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: CREA, 1, rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France

Publication date: 01 March 1998

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