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The Analysis of Rights

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The author argues that the interest theory of rights is clearly preferable to the choice theory of rights and that this is due in large part to the work of Raz and MacCormick. Critical scrutiny of their views, however, reveals a flawed conception of the way that rights reflect interests. The author contends that a superior relation between rights and interests can be formulated, in which rights are identified with a constellation of norms within a normative system which reflect the interests which justify them, but wherein rights are not coextensive with interests conceived as reasons for the imposition of duties.
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Document Type: Original Article

Affiliations: Brunel University

Publication date: 1997-09-01

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