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Information leakage in innovation outsourcing

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Abstract:

This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x

Affiliations: Department of Economics, National Chengchi University, Taiwan., Email: sjho@nccu.edu.tw

Publication date: November 1, 2009

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