THE ADMISSIBLE CONTENTS OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE

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In this Subject: Philosophy
By this author: Tye, Michael

Author: Tye, Michael

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 59, Number 236, July 2009 , pp. 541-562(22)

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Abstract:

My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of visual experience.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.575.x

Publication date: 2009-07-01