EXPERIENCE AND CONTENT

In this: publication
By this: publisher
In this Subject: Philosophy
By this author: Byrne, Alex

Author: Byrne, Alex

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 59, Number 236, July 2009 , pp. 429-451(23)

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Abstract:

The `content view', in slogan form, is `Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to `experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of `mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are partially vindicated, because perceptual error is due to false belief.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.614.x

Publication date: 2009-07-01