Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification
Author: Thurow, Joshua
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Number 225, October 2006 , pp. 596-602(7)
Abstract:In his recent book Albert Casullo rejects the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. This claim is a crucial premise in a simple argument for the experiential defeasibility of a priori justification. I defend the premise against Casullo's objection, the main problem with which is that he does not take into account the evidential role of multiple corroborating sources of testimony. I conclude that the crucial premise is true and that the simple argument is sound; thus many of our a priori justified beliefs are experientially defeasible.
Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2006-10-01