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Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification

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Abstract:

Abstract

In his recent book Albert Casullo rejects the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. This claim is a crucial premise in a simple argument for the experiential defeasibility of a priori justification. I defend the premise against Casullo's objection, the main problem with which is that he does not take into account the evidential role of multiple corroborating sources of testimony. I conclude that the crucial premise is true and that the simple argument is sound; thus many of our a priori justified beliefs are experientially defeasible.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.461.x

Publication date: 2006-10-01

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