ARE THERE NON-EXISTENT INTENTIONALIA?

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Abstract:

Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived of as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. While I take this metaphysical thesis to be correct, I cast doubt on whether it excludes intentionalia, especially non-existent ones, from the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think it does. There is a tension here, since Crane uses intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states, but at the same time attempts to dispense with them. If my doubts are grounded, the tension disappears.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00451.x

Affiliations: Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia

Publication date: July 1, 2006

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