INTENTIONALISM AND THE IMAGINABILITY OF THE INVERTED SPECTRUM

Author: Marcus, Eric1

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Number 224, July 2006 , pp. 321-339(19)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

Various thought-experiments have been offered as independent support for the possibility of intentionalism-defeating spectrum inversion, but they do not succeed. I refute what I take to be the four best arguments for holding that the thought-experiments do in fact provide such support: the implausible error argument, the symmetry argument, the no-inference argument and the best theory of representation argument. I thus offer a defence of intentionalism against a long-standing objection.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00445.x

Affiliations: 1: Auburn University, Alabama

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