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INTENTIONALISM AND THE IMAGINABILITY OF THE INVERTED SPECTRUM

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Various thought-experiments have been offered as independent support for the possibility of intentionalism-defeating spectrum inversion, but they do not succeed. I refute what I take to be the four best arguments for holding that the thought-experiments do in fact provide such support: the implausible error argument, the symmetry argument, the no-inference argument and the best theory of representation argument. I thus offer a defence of intentionalism against a long-standing objection.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Auburn University, Alabama

Publication date: 2006-07-01

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