DEFEATERS AND HIGHER-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
Author: Bergmann, Michael
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 55, Number 220, July 2005 , pp. 419-436(18)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our belief must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of scepticism.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x
Affiliations: 1: Purdue University, Indiana
Publication date: 2005-07-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Bergmann, Michael

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