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Brandom on Practical Reason

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Abstract:

Robert Brandom claims that language expressing pro-attitudes makes explicit proprieties of practical inference. This thesis is untenable, especially given certain premises which Brandom himself endorses. Pro-attitude vocabulary has the wrong grammatical structure; other parts of vocabulary do the job he ascribes to pro-attitude vocabulary; the thesis introduces implausible differences between the inferential consequences of desires and intentions, and distorts the interpretation of conditional statements. Rather, I suggest, logical vocabulary can make proprieties of practical inference explicit, just as the inferentialist says it can for theoretical inference.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00332

Affiliations: Valparaiso University, Indiana, USA

Publication date: October 1, 2003

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