Skip to main content

‘I’-Thoughts and Explanation: Reply to Garrett

Buy Article:

$43.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)


Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of ‘I’-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize ‘I’-thoughts, even though an important class of ‘I’-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of ‘I’ as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. ‘I’thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The dependence here has to do with how a thinker understands what would defeat such thoughts.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of Stirling

Publication date: 2003-07-01

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more