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Probabilistic Induction and Hume's Problem: Reply to Lange

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Abstract

Marc Lange has criticized my assertion that relative to a Bayesian conception of inductive reasoning, Hume's argument for inductive scepticism cannot be run. I reply that the way in which Lange suggests one should run the Humean argument in a Bayesian framework ignores the fact that in Bayesian models of learning from experience, the domain of an agent's probability measure is exogenously determined. I also show that Lange is incorrect to equate probability distributions which ‘support inductive inferences’ with probability distributions which assign probability to contingent propositions/events.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of York and Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico

Publication date: 2003-07-01

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