Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental?

Author: Shea N.¹

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Number 211, April 2003 , pp. 201-213(13)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00306

Affiliations: 1: King's College, London

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