@article {Witmer:April 2003:0031-8094:181,
	author = "Witmer D.G.",
	title = "Dupres Anti-Essentialist Objection to Reductionism",
	journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
	volume = "53",
	year = "April 2003",
	abstract = "In his ‘The Disorder of Things’ John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the ‘anti–essentialist objection’: it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis.",
	pages = "181-200(20)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00305"
}