Dupré's Anti–Essentialist Objection to Reductionism

Author: Witmer D.G.1

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Number 211, April 2003 , pp. 181-200(20)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

In his ‘The Disorder of Things’ John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the ‘anti–essentialist objection’: it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00305

Affiliations: 1: University of Florida

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