Dupré's Anti–Essentialist Objection to Reductionism
Author: Witmer, D. Gene
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Number 211, 1 April 2003 , pp. 181-200(20)
Abstract:In his ‘The Disorder of Things’ John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the ‘anti–essentialist objection’: it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: University of Florida
Publication date: 1 April 2003