Abstract:

I show how the `inner-sense' (quasi-perceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential `argument from self-blindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be self-blind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and self-knowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is third-person evidence available to the self-blind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00294

Affiliations: 1: Claremont McKenna College, California