@article {Kind:January 2003:0031-8094:39,
	author = "Kind, Amy",
	title = "Shoemaker, SelfBlindness and Moore's Paradox",
	journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
	volume = "53",
	year = "January 2003",
	abstract = "I show how the `inner-sense' (quasi-perceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential `argument from self-blindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be self-blind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and self-knowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is third-person evidence available to the self-blind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.",
	pages = "39-48(10)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000210/art00003"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00294"
}