Lewis' Strawman

Authors: Margolis, Eric¹; Laurence, Stephen²

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 52, Number 206, January 2002 , pp. 55-65(11)

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Abstract:

In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, `Strawman'. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. The theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk-psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing (amongst other things) that he underestimates Strawman's theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00252

Affiliations: 1: Rice University, 2: University of Sheffield, UK, Email: S.Laurence@sheffield.ac.uk

Publication date: 2002-01-01