Gruesome Connections

Author: McGowan, Mary Kate¹

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 52, Number 206, January 2002 , pp. 21-33(13)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

It is widely recognized that Goodman's grue example demonstrates that the rules for induction, unlike those for deduction, cannot be purely syntactic. Ways in which Goodman's proof generalizes, however, are not widely recognized. Gruesome considerations demonstrate that neither theories of simplicity nor theories of empirical confirmation can be purely syntactic. Moreover, the grue paradox can be seen as an instance of a much more general phenomenon. All empirical investigations require semantic constraints, since purely structural constraints are inadequate. Both Russell's theory of empirical knowledge and Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism illustrate the inadequacy of purely structural constraints.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00250

Affiliations: 1: Wellesley, College, Email: mmcgowan@wellesley.edu

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