Dispositional Essentialism and the Possibility of a Law-Abiding Miracle

Author: Handfield T.1

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Number 205, October 2001 , pp. 484-494(11)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

An objection to dispositional essentialism has been that it yields an implausible semantics for counterfactuals if determinism happens to be true. I claim that an adequate remedy to this objection would be to endorse the metaphysical possibility of ‘law-abiding miracles’, i.e., uncaused spontaneous events. This proposal entails that determinism de jure is meta-physically impossible; I argue that this is not a serious disadvantage. I discuss consequences of the proposal for the logical form of laws, and consider a possible objection to the proposal on epistemic grounds.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00242

Affiliations: 1: Monash University. t.handfield@bigfoot.com

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