Realism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions: Reply to Malzkorn

Author: Mumford S.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Number 204, July 2001 , pp. 375-378(4)

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Abstract:

Wolfgang Malzkorn proposes, in his ‘Realism, Functionalism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 452–69, a new conditional analysis of dispositions in which disposition ascriptions are made against a background of ‘normal conditions’ that exclude the possibility of electro-finks and other such interfering conditions. I argue in reply that whenever a list of conditions is specified there will (almost) always be some further possible condition that prevents the disposition from manifesting, so the conditional analysis fails. Further, disposition ascriptions in general are made against a background of ideal conditions, not normal conditions, since technology is the use of dispositions of things in abnormal circumstances. Occasionally, ‘ideal’ and ‘normal’ may coincide.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00235

Affiliations: 1: University of Nottingham

Publication date: 2001-07-01