Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism

Author: Beebee H.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Number 204, July 2001 , pp. 356-374(19)

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Abstract:

Martin Davies argues that ‘limitation principles’ block the transfer of warrant from the premises of a certain kind of argument to its conclusion. The class of arguments in question includes Moore's argument for the existence of the external world, and a popular style of argument which starts from two premises that are warranted by first-person authority and semantic externalism respectively, ending with a conclusion that does not, allegedly, admit of a priori justification. I argue that the relevant class of arguments can be shown to be unconvincing without appealing to any limitation principles, by showing that they beg the question against sceptical opponents. Principles limiting the transfer of warrant are not required in order to rebut the claim that first-person authority and semantic externalism are incompatible.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00234

Affiliations: 1: University of Manchester

Publication date: 2001-07-01