The Semantics of ‘Things in Themselves’: a Deflationary Account

Author: Kroon F.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 51, Number 203, April 2001 , pp. 165-181(17)

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Abstract:

Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear, or appearances, is commonly attacked on the ground that it delivers a radical and incoherent ‘two world’ picture of what there is. I attempt to deflect this attack by questioning these terms of dismissal. Distinctions of the kind Kant draws on are in fact legion, and they make perfectly good sense. The way to make sense of them, however, is not by buying into a profligate ontology but by using some rather different tools – surprisingly enough, tools first developed in the area of aesthetics. Once this is done, much of what Kant says begins to look perfectly coherent. In the final part of the paper, I point out that none the less all is not well. Kant's Critical doctrines make it hard for us to accept Kant's own version of this otherwise coherent distinction.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00222.x

Affiliations: 1: University of Auckland

Publication date: 2001-04-01