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In-between Believing

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For any proposition p, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that p, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that p. I describe such a person as in an ‘in-between state of belief’. I argue for the prevalence of in-between states of believing, and assert the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. I suggest that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are inadequate to the task, and that a Rylean dispositional account of belief might do the trick.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of California, Riverside

Publication date: 2001-01-01

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