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In-between Believing

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Abstract:

For any proposition p, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that p, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that p. I describe such a person as in an ‘in-between state of belief’. I argue for the prevalence of in-between states of believing, and assert the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. I suggest that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are inadequate to the task, and that a Rylean dispositional account of belief might do the trick.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00215

Affiliations: University of California, Riverside

Publication date: January 1, 2001

bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000202/art00006
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