On Pascal's Wager, or Why All Bets are Off

Author: Carter A.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Number 198, January 2000 , pp. 22-27(6)

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Abstract:

Pascal's wager seems to demonstrate that it is rational to believe in God and to act accordingly. I argue, however, that Pascal's wager appears to establish that it is rational to believe exclusively in p, while also apparently establishing that it is rational to hold exclusively a contrary belief. I also argue that the wager seems to establish that it is rational to perform only actions of type F, while also seemingly establishing that it is rational to perform contrary actions as often as possible. Thus Pascal's argument appears to establish far too much. And in apparently establishing too much, it establishes, in effect, nothing at all.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Heythrop College, University of London

Publication date: 2000-01-01