Expressions and their Representations
Author: Szabó Z.G.
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 195, April 1999 , pp. 145-163(19)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
It is plausible to think that our knowledge of linguistic types can bejustified by what we know about the tokens of these types. But one then hasto explain what it is about the relation a type bears to its tokens that makespossible the move from knowledge of the concrete to knowledge of theabstract. I argue that the standard solution to this difficulty, that the relevant relation is instantiation and that the transition is inductive generalization, is inadequate. I propose an alternative, according to which tokens are representations of the type they belong to. I also defend this view against the charge that it cannot account for the systematic ambiguity of expressions like word or sentence, and the objection that it leads to an implausible form of Platonism.Document Type: Original article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00134
Affiliations: 1: Cornell University
Publication date: 1999-04-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Szabó Z.G.

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