Naturalism and Conceptual Norms
Author: Bermúdez J.L.
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 194, January 1999 , pp. 77-85(9)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
The normative dimensions of concept possession pose a serious problem for naturalistic approaches to the mental. Taking Christopher Peacockes recent proposal for a naturalistic accommodation of conceptual normativity as a stalking-horse, I argue that no proposal formulated in terms of law-like generalizations about the judgements which a concept possessor must find primitively compelling or self-evident can capture the crucial distinction between failing to possess a concept and misapplying a concept which one does actually possess.Document Type: Original article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00130
Affiliations: 1: University of Stirling
Publication date: 1999-01-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Bermúdez J.L.

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