Naturalism and Conceptual Norms

Author: Bermúdez J.L.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 194, January 1999 , pp. 77-85(9)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Buy & download fulltext article:

OR

Price: $48.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The normative dimensions of concept possession pose a serious problem for naturalistic approaches to the mental. Taking Christopher Peacocke’s recent proposal for a naturalistic accommodation of conceptual normativity as a stalking-horse, I argue that no proposal formulated in terms of law-like generalizations about the judgements which a concept possessor must find primitively compelling or self-evident can capture the crucial distinction between failing to possess a concept and misapplying a concept which one does actually possess.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00130

Affiliations: 1: University of Stirling

Publication date: 1999-01-01

Related content

Tools

Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page