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Naturalism and Conceptual Norms

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The normative dimensions of concept possession pose a serious problem for naturalistic approaches to the mental. Taking Christopher Peacocke’s recent proposal for a naturalistic accommodation of conceptual normativity as a stalking-horse, I argue that no proposal formulated in terms of law-like generalizations about the judgements which a concept possessor must find primitively compelling or self-evident can capture the crucial distinction between failing to possess a concept and misapplying a concept which one does actually possess.
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Document Type: Original Article

Affiliations: University of Stirling

Publication date: 1999-01-01

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