Ordinary Versus Super-Omniscient Interpreters

Author: Marton P.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 194, January 1999 , pp. 72-77(6)

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Abstract:

The sceptic argues that we have little, if any, empirical knowledge. Recently Davidson offered a solution to this challenge by introducing his famous omniscient interpreter argument. Many of Davidson‘s critics claim that his solution is obviously flawed, since there is an unbridgeable gap between its premises. But I argue that even if his answer is formally acceptable, it is still problematic because circular. I focus on its modal character. Accordingly, a super-omniscient interpreter is introduced, who can beat Davidson’s ordinary omniscient interpreter. This demonstrates that Davidson’s semantic theory is not adequate for rebutting external-world scepticism; his argument is either circular or incorrigibly inconclusive.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00129

Affiliations: 1: Brown University

Publication date: 1999-01-01