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Humean Justified Belief

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Orthodoxy has it that Hume was a sceptic with respect to justified beliefs about matters of fact. Tom Beauchamp, Alexander Rosenberg and Michael Costa have argued in the face of this traditional interpretation by proposing that Hume held something like an account of justification according to which we do sometimes justifiedly believe matters of fact. I consider the arguments raised by these authors, and argue that though they are correct in suggesting that Hume sketched considerations distinguishing beliefs as more or less justified, they have misunderstood Hume in certain critical respects.
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Document Type: Original Article

Affiliations: North Carolina State University

Publication date: 1998-07-01

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