Skip to main content

Duns Scotus on the Immaterial

Buy Article:

$43.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Can anything logically be immaterial in any of the three senses of the term distinguished by Scotus? His first definition, using the notion of dependence, seems not to work. The second and third, using extension and abstractness, do not provide necessary conditions of immateriality, and do not distinguish different senses of the term. But being non-spatial is indeed a sufficient condition of being immaterial, and I argue that there could be non-spatial and therefore immaterial existents.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Data/Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Original Article

Affiliations: University of Edinburgh

Publication date: 1998-07-01

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more