Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement
Abstract:Wright argues that if there are moral disagreements that cannot be attributed to inferential error, ignorance of relevant data or some similar form of deficiency (i.e., what I call ‘radical’ disagreements), then moral realists are committed to the view that moral truths are evidence-transcendent. Moreover, since he thinks that this view is implausible and that moral disagreements can indeed be radical, he has suggested that we should reject realism here. I indicate how a realist can respond to this challenge, by offering two arguments to the effect that a realist might plausibly hold that moral disagreements can never be found to be radical. However, this is not so much intended to be a defence of moral realism as a critique of Wright’s basic strategy, since a similar defence may be provided in support of realism about any (minimally truth-apt) discourse.
Document Type: Original Article
Affiliations: Stockholm University
Publication date: 1998-07-01