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Resemblance Cannot be Partial Identity

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I demonstrate that analysing the resemblance of properties in terms of partial identity has insuperable logical consequences. It follows that the strategy of vindicating the realism of universals against particularistic ontologies such as tropism by appeal to partial identity is incoherent.

Document Type: Research Article


Affiliations: Bogazici University, Istanbul

Publication date: 1998-04-01

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