@article {Hacker:July 1997:0031-8094:285,
author = "Hacker P.M.S.",
title = "Davidson on First-Person Authority",
journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
volume = "47",
year = "July 1997",
abstract = "Davidson’s explanation of first-person authority in utterance of sentences of the form ‘I V that p’ derives first-person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth-bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker’s knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first-person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker’s meaning. Davidson’s account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person Vs that p, he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson’s conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein’s.",
pages = "285-304(20)",
url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/1997/00000047/00000188/art00001"
doi = "doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00060"
}