The Properties of Mental Causation

Author: Robb D.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Number 187, April 1997 , pp. 178-194(17)

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Abstract:

Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that ‘properties’ is used in different senses in the principles. In (1) and (3), ‘properties’ should be read as ‘tropes’ (properties here are particulars), while in (2) ‘properties’ should read as ‘types’ (properties here are universals or classes). Although mental types are distinct from physical types, every mental trope is a physical trope. This allows mental properties to be causally relevant to physical effects without violating the closed character of the physical world.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00054

Affiliations: 1: Davidson College, NC 28036, USA

Publication date: 1997-04-01