Mendus on Philosophy and Pervasiveness

Author: Landau I.¹

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Number 186, January 1997 , pp. 89-93(5)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

This is a rejoinder to Susan Mendus’‘How Androcentric is Western Philosophy? a Reply’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 46 (1996), pp. 60–6, which addresses my ‘How Androcentric is Western Philosophy?’, ib., pp. 48–59. The viability of the distinction between pervasive and non-pervasive androcentrism is defended, but I claim that most claims in the original paper do not presuppose it. Moreover, the original paper does not presuppose that there is a clear demarcation line between pervasive and non-pervasive androcentrism. I argue further that one can make use of some parts of philosophical systems while rejecting others, that Gilligan does see ethics as pervasively androcentric, and that Rawls’ theory is not a good example of pervasive androcentrism.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00050

Affiliations: 1: University of Haifa

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