Hume’s Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

Author: Sobel J.H.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Number 186, January 1997 , pp. 55-72(18)

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Abstract:

A theory of right action is implicit in Hume’s delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to ‘rules of justice’ as Hume’s remarks on ‘that species of utility which attends this virtue’ require. It is a useful actual-rule, not an ideal possible-rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in ‘extraordinary cases’, has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question ‘Why not hark directly to the supreme law of utility in every case?’. It does not reflect contractarian considerations of mutuality of interests evident in Hume’s texts, which while sometimes relevant to what is reasonable, are in his view never also relevant to what is moral.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00046

Affiliations: 1: University of Toronto

Publication date: 1997-01-01