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Has the Later Wittgenstein Accounted for Necessity?

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Abstract:

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the later Wittgenstein's conventionalist account of necessity. I first show that necessary propositions and grammatical rules differ in ways that make an explanation of the former in terms of the latter inadequate. I then argue that even if Wittgenstein's account were adequate, the explanation of necessity it offers would still fail to be genuinely reductive of the modal notion.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.00331.x

Publication date: January 1, 2008

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