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Do the Concepts of Grammar and Use in Wittgenstein Articulate a Theory of Language or Meaning?

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Abstract:

Abstract

The paper elucidates Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy as devoid of theories or theses, comprehending this as an articulation of a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy. More specifically, it clarifies Wittgenstein's conception by using what he says about the concepts of meaning and language as an example and by developing an interpretation that purports to make plain that what Wittgenstein says about these issues does not constitute a philosophical thesis. Adopting Wittgenstein's approach, we can, arguably, have a richer view of meaning and language than a commitment to philosophical theses allows for. I conclude with remarks on the method of analysis in terms of necessary conditions.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2006.00298.x

Publication date: 2006-10-01

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