Author: Patterson, Dennis

Source: Philosophical Investigations, Volume 29, Number 2, April 2006 , pp. 129-139(11)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Abstract:

Wittgenstein's distinction between understanding and interpretation is fundamental to the account of meaning in Philosophical Investigations. In his discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Wittgenstein explains meaning and rule-following in terms of action, rejecting both realist and Cartesian accounts of the mental. I argue that in his effort to employ Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule-following, Professor Morawetz embraces the position Wittgenstein rejects. In the course of making his case for law as a “deliberative practice,” Professor Morawetz embraces interpretation as a fundamental element of human practices, thereby taking up precisely the view Wittgenstein rejects

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2006.00283.x

Publication date: 2006-04-01

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